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FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATES-1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
HERMAN L. TRAUTMAN*
Worthier Title-A Rule of Property: In Cochran v. Frierson' the
Supreme Court affirmed the rule of Robinson v. Blankenship2 that the
doctrine of worthier title is still a rule of absolute property law in
Tennessee, and not a rule of construction. The Blankenship case is
nationally recognized as representative of the early English doctrine
which was abolished by statute in England in 1833. 3 The doctrine has-
been modified by the majority of American courts which hold that it
is a rule of construction.4
In the Cochran case, A, the owner of land in fee simple, executed a
deed in 1886 which conveyed to her daughter, B, an estate for life, then
to B's surviving issue per stirpes, and in default of such issue the land
was to "revert" to A, "or her heirs.' 5 A died in 1920 leaving B, her
only child, as her sole heir and next of kin. B died in 1950 without
having 'had any children, and leaving a will devising the land in fee
simple to certain devisees. A partition suit was filed by some of the
nephews and nieces of A against other nephews and nieces, all of
whom would be heirs at law of A, determined after the death of B in
1950. The devisees of B were allowed to intervene, and the actual
litigation is between the devisees of B and the nephews and nieces of
A. The nephews and nieces contended that the deed created a life
estate in B and alternative contingent remainders; that one alternative
contingent remainder was to the surviving issue per stirpes of B, an-
other to A, and another to the heirs of A; that since the first two alter-
natives failed to vest at the expiration of the life estate, the third alter-
native should be regarded as vesting the fee simple in those who would
be A's heirs if she had died in 1950 after the death of B. Holding for
the devisees of B, the Supreme Court held that under the 1886 deed
A retained a reversion subject to a contingent remainder in the sur-
viving issue of B, that at A's death in 1920 this reversion descended to
B, thereby vesting in B a fee simple estate; and on B's death without
surviving issue, the title passed under B's will to her devisees.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member of Nashville and
Tennessee Bars.
1. 195 Tenn. 174, 258 S.W.2d 748 (1953).
2. 116 Tenn. 394, 92 S.W. 854 (1906).
3. 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 106, § 3 (1833); see Cochran v. Frierson, 195 Tenn. 174,
258 S.W.2d 748, 750 (1953).
4. 1 AmuP Cix LAW oF PRoPERTY § 4.19, n. 7 and cases there cited (Casner
ed. 1952).
5. 195 Tenn. 174, 176, 258 S.W.2d 748, 749 (1953).
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The essential requisite for the creation of a reversion is that a person
transfer a lesser estate than that which he owns. Where a person,
owning in fee simple, conveys a life estate and a contingent remainder
in fee simple, the grantor automatically has a reversion which will be
divested when the contingent remainder becomes a vested remainder."
Suppose A, owning land in fee simple, conveys to B for life, remainder
to the heirs of A. What is the status of the title? Clearly the rule in
Shelley's case is not applicable, because the remainder is not to the
heirs of the life tenant. On its face the limitation seems to create a
life estate in B, a contingent remainder in the heirs of A, and a rever-
sion in A subject to being divested when and if the contingent re-
mainder should become vested. In English feudal law, 'however, it
was said that the acquisition of title by descent was a worthier7 title
than one acquired by purchase-i.e. by deed or will. Applying this
principle to the example given, it was held that A owned an absolute
reversion in fee simple, and that the deed did not create a contingent
remainder at all. It was said to be worthier that the heirs of A should
take by descent from him rather than by the deed. In a civilization
where commercial transactions in land were only very seldom, the
chances were not unlikely that A's heirs would take by descent too!
Sometimes this doctrine is referred to as the rule that a grantor
cannot create a remainder in his own heirs. Actually the rule is not
limited to remainders. It applies to all types of interests, present and
future. In states where it has been modified from a rule of property
to a rule of construction, it has been extended to personal property,
tangible and intangible, and to transfers in trust as well as to direct
transfers.8 In its modern form in most states the rule may be stated
thus: When an inter vivos conveyance of real property contains a
limitation to the 'heirs of the conveyor, or an inter vivos conveyance
of personal property contains a limitation to the next of kin of the
conveyor, such limitation is construed, in the absence of additional
language showing a contrary intent, as void, and there is a rever-
sionary interest in the conveyor. In those states it is said that the
6. 1 SvimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 45 (1936).
7. Probably the best reason that it was considered worthier by the early
English courts was that a title acquired by descent was subject to the incidents
of feudal tenure-the inheritance and estate taxes of this period-payable to
the feudal lords who so decided.
8. Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919); Whittemore v.
Equitable Trust Co. 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929); National Shawmut Bank
of Boston v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944); Morris, The Inter-'Vivos
Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 2 OKLA. L. REV. 133 (1949); RESTATE-
1ENT, PROPERTY § 314 (1940); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.19 (Casner ed.
1952).
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rule is applicable only to inter vivos transfer; that it is obsolete as to
willsY
While the Blankenship and Cochran cases both involved deeds, there
does not seem to be any Tennessee case where the rule has been
applied to transfers of personal property. In three Tennessee cases, 0
however, there was a testamentary gift of both real and personal
property for life, followed by a gift of the remainder in fee simple
"to the heirs" of the testator. In these cases the doctrine of worthier
title is not mentioned, and the court treats the problem as if it is
wholly a problem of construing the testator's intent. In each case the
court adopts a rule of construction, different from that generally
followed elsewhere, holding that the heirs of the testator should be
ascertained as of the date of the expiration of the life estate, and not
as of the testator's death." These cases seem to be inconsistent with
the Blankenship and Cochran cases, except that the latter involve
transfers by deed, and the former involve transfers by will. Adherence
to the principle of the worthier title doctrine as expounded in Blanken-
ship would at least seem to require that in the Felts2 case and its
predecessors the heirs be determined as of the testator's death rather
than as of the expiration of the life estate.
13
In the Cochran case the court refused to adopt the modification
made in several states in accord with Judge Cardozo's view in Doctor
v. Hughes.1 4 The principle of that case is that in the absence of a
statute abolishing the rule it persists today as a rule of construction,
not a rule of property; and that there is a rebuttable presumption that
an inter vivos gift of a future estate to the heirs or next of kin of the
transferor is intended by him to be simply an end limitation creating
a reversionary interest in the transferor. Being a rule of construction,
this principle should result in the overruling of a demurrer and allow
proof that the grantor intended to create a contingent remainder.15
A third view, adopted by statute in England in 183316 and proposed
9. Morris supra note 8; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 314, comments b and j
(1940); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.19 (Casner ed. 1952).
10. Felts v. Felts, 188 Tenn. 404, 219 S.W.2d 903 (1949); Forrest v. Porch,
100 Tenn. 391, 45 S.W. 676 (1898); Parrish v. Groomes, 1 Tenn. Ch. Rep. 581
(1874).
11. See Trautman, Future Interests-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L. REv.
1096, 1111 (1953).
12. Supra note 10.
13. See note 11 supra.
14. 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
15. Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929);
Matter of Burchell (Worm v. United States Trust Co.), 299 N.Y. 351, 87
N.E.2d 293 (1949).
16. 3 & 4 Win. IV, c. 106, § 3 (1833).
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by the American Law. Institute and the Commissioners on Uniform
Laws17 would abolish the worthier title doctrine both as a rule of
property and a rule of construction. This proposed statute would
provide that in all cases of an inter vivos gift to the heirs or next of
kin of the grantor, the heirs or next of kin would take as purchasers;
so under no circumstances would there be an indefeasible reversion
in the grantor. This proposed statute has been adopted in Nebraska.1 8
A recent Minnesota statute also has the effect of abolishing the doc-
trine. 9 A Kansas statute provides that the rule is abolished as to
wills.20 North Carolina legislation to the effect that the word "heirs"
is presumed to mean children has the effect of avoiding the rule when-
ever the word "heirs" is construed to mean children;2' and a statute
to the effect that the word "heirs" is presumed to mean heirs at the
time of distribution and not at the death of the ancestor would have
the effect of avoiding the rule.
While the rule of law adopted by the Tennessee Court that an inde-
feasible reversion is always created in the grantor seems somewhat
rigid, so does the rule of law adopted in England and proposed by the
American Law Institute and the Commissioners on Uniform Laws
that a gift to heirs as grantees is always intended. Both are rigid
views at opposite extremes. The principle of Doctor v. Hughes, adopted
by the courts in many states, that the worthier title doctrine should
be a rule of construction, with a rebuttable presumption that the
grantor intended to create an indefeasible reversion, seems preferable.
The reason it is preferable is that experience seems to teach that often
the gift to the heirs at law of a grantor or testator is simply an end
limitation, written in by the lawyer-draftsman at the end, after ex-
hausting all of the alternative special beneficiaries whom the trans-
feror had in mind. Under such circumstances the transferor seldom
would have a real desire to make a class gift to those who would con-
stitute his heirs at law, with all the possible wide fluctuations which
could take place, regardless of whether they are determined as of
his death or as of the date of distribution.
The worthier title doctrine is important today for estate tax purposes
because under the Tennessee rule a reversionary interest is retained
which will cause the property to be included in the transferor's gross
estate.2 2 It is also important if the grantor subsequently marries, or
17. UNIFORM PROPERTY ACT §§ 14-15.
18. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-114, 76-115 (1943).
19. MinN. STAT ANN. § 500.14 subdiv. 4 (West 1947).
20. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-506 (1949).
21. N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 41-6 (1943). See Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C.
333, 84 S.E. 347 (1915).
22. 26 U.S.C.A. § 811(a), (c) (1948).
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if his credit6rs seek to reach his property, or when the termination of
an inter vivos trust is sought.23
The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders: The argument in
Cochran v. Frierson24 that an alternative contingent remainder was
created in favor of those nephews and nieces alive at the death of the
life tenant was rejected by the Supreme Court. But if it had been
adopted by the court as the construction of the 1886 deed, it would not
have helped the nephews and nieces if the doctrine of Ryan v.
Monaghan5 and Lumsden v. Payne 26 had been asserted. These cases
adopt in Tennessee the ancient feudal rule that a contingent remainder
is. destroyed if it fails to become vested prior to the termination of the
prior freehold estate.
2 7
Since the abolishment of the fee tail, a contingent remainder must
be supported by a life estate in Tennessee.28 When the life estate is
terminated before the contingent remainder becomes vested, the latter
is destroyed. In addition to the normal expiration of a life estate,
it is frequently terminated in modern times by a conditional event,
or by a merger of the life estate into a larger estate. Under common
law doctrine there can be no such thing as a fee simple subject to a
contingent remainder; but there can be a fee simple subject to an
executory interest.
29
Applying this principle to the argued analysis in Cochran v. Frier-
son, if the deed is construed to create a life estate in B with alternative
contingent remainders, there is automatically created a defeasible
reversion in the grantor which would have been divested when one of
the alternative contingent remainders became vested. When the
grantor died in 1920, this reversion necessarily descended to B, the life
tenant, who was also the grantor's sole heir at law. Under the prin-
ciple of merger, referred to in Blackstone,"° the life estate is merged
into the reversion to make a fee simple, so that the contingent re-
mainder is no longer supported by a life estate, and accordingly is
destroyed.
31
The destructibility rule, applicable only to real estate, makes it
23. See note 15 supra.
24. Supra note 1.
25. 99 Tenn. 338, 42 S.W. 144 (1897).
26. 120 Tenn. 407, 114 S.W. 483 (1907).
27. 1 AMEmCx LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 4.59-4.63 (Casner ed. 1952); 1 SnVIEs,
FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 98-102 (1936).
28. Notes 25 and 26 supra.
29. Note 27 supra.
30. 2 BL. COMM. *177.
31. 1 AmERicAw LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.60 (Casner ed. 1952); 1 SIMES, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 102 (1936).
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-necessary for the lawyers in Tennessee who draft deeds, wills and
trust instruments, to distinguish between contingent remainders and
executory interests. The latter are not affected by the rule.
Class Gift or Gift to Individuals: In Jones v. Donelson3 2 the testatrix
made a gift of her estate as follows:
"I wish my estate to be divided equally between my sister, Mrs. John
Donelson and nieces, Mrs. Mary Hooper Donelson Jones, Mrs. Eleanor
Ran'dle Hunter, Mrs. Mary Love Doubleday, Mrs. Elizabeth Love Brittain,
and Mrs. Grayson Love Hancock. In the event either should pass away,
divide estate among remaining ones."
33
o
The testatrix was survived by all of the named beneficiaries. The
question of construction is whether the testatrix intended for her
estate to be divided into six equal shares; or whether she intended
for her sister to receive one-half, and for the remaining half to be
divided equally among her nieces.. The Chancellor adopted the latter
construction. The Court of Appeals, Middle Section, reversed and
entered a decree deciding that the estate should be divided into six
equal shares.
In behalf of the sister it was argued that the testatrix intended to
constitute her sister "as one class and the nieces as another class, the
sister taking one-half and the nieces the other half."3 4 The court went
to some length to show that this was not a class gift. Characteristics
of a class gift are that the will shows that the testator is more inter-
ested in a group, as such, rather than particular individuals, and that
there is some possibility of a fluctuation in the membership of the
group between the execution of the will and either the death of the
testator or the time of distribution.35 Where the beneficiaries are
specified by their individual names, the construction preference has
become rather firmly established that a gift to individuals is intended,
and not to a class.36 But in some cases this construction preference
may be overcome where there is other evidence of intent to create
a class gift.37
In view of the second sentence of the will in the Donelson case as
set forth above, it would not seem to make any difference whether
the will is construed to create a class gift or a gift to separate indi-
32. 264 S.W.2d 828 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954).
33. Id. at 829.
34. Id. at 830.
35. See generally 5 AmERCAI LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 22.4-22.11 (Casner ed.
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viduals. Under either construction, only those beneficiaries living at
the death of the testatrix could take. The basic ambiguity seems to
continue whether you regard the sister and the nieces as a single
class, two classes, or as individual beneficiaries. Was it intended that
the sister share equally with the nieces? Or was she to receive one-
half the net estate?
Mortgage By Life Tenant-Special Improvement Tax: In Morrow v.
Person," the testator made a gift of land to his widow for life, remain-
der to his daughter for life, and remainder in fee to the children of
the daughter. After the widow's death, the daughter took possession of
the land and mortgaged it. This mortgage was foreclosed and the
daughter's interest was purchased by the defendant. A part of the
land was later sold to A for delinquent drainage district assessments.
The defendant then purchased the land from A. Held, when the de-
fendant purchased the land sold for delinquent special improve-
ments tax, he did not thereby defeat the rights of the remaindermen;
the title so acquired by the life tenant will be considered as a redemp-
tion and restoration of the rights of the remaindermen as well as of
the life tenant; the remaindermen, however, will have to pay their
portiQn of the delinquent assessments.
The apportionment of charges, expenses, and improvements be-
tween life tenant and remaindermen or reversioners is often difficult
to ascertain and to calculate fairly. Taxes, insurance, mortgage princi-
pal and interest, and necessary repairs are indicative of the sources of
dispute. The life tenant is usually required to pay current taxes during
the period of his ownership, limited to the value of the rents and
profits to which he is entitled.39 But since a permanent improvement
adds to the value of the remainder or reversion as well as to the value
of the life estate, it is generally held that the special assessment must
be apportioned according to the value of the estate of each.40 The
value of the life estate and that of the remainder are determined by
first finding the value of the life .estate. This is done by computing
the present value of an annuity equal to the annual income or rental
value of the property for the probable duration of the life of the life
tenant, and then subtracting the value of the life estate so found from
the present total value of the property. The difference will be the
value of the estate in reversion or remainder.41 The life tenant is
38. 195 Tenn. 370, 258 S.W.2d 665 (1953).
39. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.19 (Casner ed. 1952); 3 SInES, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 631 (1936).
40. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.21 (Casner ed. 1952); 3 SIxES, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 635 (1936).
41. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 2.21, 2.25 (Casner ed. 1952).
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charged with the entire~amount where the life of the improvement is
not in excess of the probable duration of the life estate.
42
The instant case holds in accord with what seems to be a well
established principle that the life tenant of land is a trustee for re-
maindermen. The courts have applied this principle to hold that
neither a life tenant nor one claiming under him may allow the prop-
erty to be sold for taxes, or the satisfaction of an encumbrance, or
interest, and later acquire a title adverse to the remaindermen or
reversioner by purchasing at the sale himself, or through another.43
42. Wordin's Appeal, 71 Conn. 531, 42 Atl. 659 (1899); Huston v. Tribbetts,
171 Ill. 547, 49 N.E. 711 (1898); Reyburn v. Wallace, 93 Mo. 326, 3 S.W. 482
(1887); Hitner v. Page, 23 Pa. 305 (1854).
43. King v. Sharp, 25 Tenn. 55, 57 (1845); Miller v. Gratz, 3 Tenn. App.
'498, 508 (1926); 21 CoR. JuR., Estates § 74, (1920); 31 C.J.S. Estates § 35 (1942).
